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The Responsibility of Judges in 
Interpreting Tax Legislation: Japan’s 
Experience
YOSHIHIRO MASUI*
This essay examines the Japanese judiciary’s approach to statutory interpretation of tax 
legislation in Japan. Its goal is to provide a positive, rather than normative, analysis of 
current Supreme Court of Japan (SCJ) tax jurisprudence. The analysis demonstrates that 
SCJ justices generally employ a literal approach when interpreting tax legislation, but with 
due regard to the objective and purpose of specific statutory provisions. This does not mean 
that SCJ justices constrain their reasoning based on an originalist approach to statutory 
interpretation. The analysis instead demonstrates that they make their own judgments, 
taking into account both the plain meaning of the provisions at issue as well as the objective 
and purpose of the legislation.
Cet article examine l’approche judiciaire du Japon de l’interprétation législative des lois 
fiscales du Japon. Il se propose d’offrir une analyse positive, plutôt que normative, de la 
jurisprudence fiscale actuelle de la Cour suprême du Japon (CSJ). Cette analyse démontre 
que les juges de la CSJ adoptent généralement une approche littérale lorsqu’ils interprètent 
les lois fiscales, mais en respectant strictement l’objectif et l’intention de dispositions 
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légales particulières. Cela ne signifie pas pour autant que les juges de la CSJ s’astreignent 
à conserver une approche rigide quand vient le temps d’interpréter les lois. L’analyse 
démontre au contraire qu’ils formulent leur propre jugement en tenant compte à la fois du 
sens manifeste des dispositions en question et de l’objectif et de l’intention de la loi.
IN A PAPER CONTRIBUTED TO A CONFERENCE held in Sydney, Australia, in May 
1995, Neil Brooks argued that judges should act as “pragmatic tax analysts.”1 
According to Brooks, the judiciary’s responsibility in interpreting an income tax 
statute was to elaborate on the provisions of the statute “in order to ensure … 
that they conform to a coherent model of how an income tax statute should 
be structured.”2 Brooks surveyed various theories of statutory interpretation 
and reviewed Canadian tax jurisprudence to demonstrate that his “pragmatic 
tax analyst approach” to statutory interpretation was preferable to the Canadian 
judiciary’s conventional originalist approach.
Graeme Cooper described Brooks’s proposition as expressing a “rather less 
orthodox view,”3 according to which:
[J]udges should not ask, What did Parliament say? nor, What did Parliament mean 
to say? nor even, What was Parliament trying to accomplish? but rather, “What 
result would reflect the most sensible tax policy?” and then adjudicate on that basis. 
Clearly this is heady stuff.4
1. Neil Brooks, “The Responsibility of Judges in Interpreting Tax Legislation” in Graeme S 
Cooper, ed, Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law (Amsterdam: IBFD, 1997) 93.
2. Ibid at 98.
3. Graeme S Cooper, “Conflicts, Challenges and Choices—The Rule of Law and 
Anti-Avoidance Rules” in Cooper, supra note 1, 13 at 19.
4. Ibid at 20.
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Cooper went on to observe, correctly in my opinion, that, despite Brooks’s 
argument, courts are “reluctant to participate openly in the law-making process.”5
My position on this matter generally favours Brooks’s argument, but takes 
Cooper’s critique into account. Although judges make decisions in the context 
of each case, their decisions inevitably shape broader tax policy. Yet they do so 
without openly engaging in a political battle in the law-making arena. All lawyers 
know the trick more or less, despite the fact that many hesitate to admit it as 
candidly as Brooks.
The purpose of this article is to uncover Japanese judges’ approaches to 
interpreting and applying Japanese tax legislation. This article is not as ambitious 
as Brooks’s paper: it does not make a strong claim for judges to “get their act 
together.”6 The goal is to contribute a positive, rather than a normative, analysis 
of current Supreme Court of Japan (SCJ) tax jurisprudence. In doing so, I 
will demonstrate that Japanese judges indeed play a significant role in the tax 
law-making process.7 The SCJ tends to adopt a literal approach to the interpreta-
tion of tax legislation, but with due regard to the object and purpose of specific 
statutory provisions. This does not mean that SCJ justices constrain their reasoning 
based on an originalist approach to statutory interpretation. Instead, this article 
demonstrates that they make their own judgments, taking into account the plain 
meaning of the words as well as the purpose of the legislation.
Part I of this article provides an overview of the constitutional origins of 
Japanese tax legislation, and the structure of the judiciary and tax-related tribunals 
in Japan. Part II examines Japanese judges’ approaches to statutory interpretation 
in SCJ tax jurisprudence. The section discusses cases in which the SCJ has adopted 
either narrow or broad interpretations of statutory language based on literal or 
teleological approaches to statutory interpretation. The section also examines 
cases in which SCJ justices have interpreted taxation provisions that incorpo-
rated concepts transplanted from private law. Part III turns to legislative and 
judicial responses to tax avoidance in Japan. Japanese tax legislation has a number 
of relatively broad Specific Anti-Avoidance Rules (SAARs) but does not have a 
General Anti-Avoidance Rule (GAAR). The analysis demonstrates that, overall, 
Japanese judges’ responses to tax avoidance are rather constrained, though more 
5. Ibid.
6. Brooks, supra note 1 at 101-103.
7. See also Yoshihiro Masui, “Legal Interpretation of Tax Law: Japan” in Robert F van 
Brederode & Richard Krever, eds, Legal Interpretation of Tax Law (Alphen aan den Rijn, The 
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2014) 251.
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recent decisions indicate a trend toward rejecting abusive tax avoidance schemes 
based on rather creative approaches to statutory interpretation.
I. JAPANESE TAX LAW, COURTS, AND TRIBUNALS
The Japanese Constitution vests all judicial power in the SCJ and prohibits the 
establishment of extraordinary courts.8 Therefore, no special tax court exists in 
Japan. Tax cases, both civil and criminal, are litigated before judges who may 
not necessarily be experts in tax matters.9 The Constitution also declares that all 
judges shall be independent in the exercise of their conscience and shall be bound 
only by the Constitution and the laws.10
In 2013, there were 15 justices on the SCJ, 2,897 judges on the lower courts 
of Japan, and 806 judges on the summary courts. Approximately 20 per cent of 
these judges were women.11 Almost without exception judges are appointed at a 
young age (usually in their twenties) and continue to work as judges throughout 
their career. The Cabinet appoints judges of the lower courts from a list of 
nominees put forward by the SCJ. All lower court judges hold office for a term of 
ten years, with the privilege of reappointment subject to mandatory retirement 
at age sixty-five.12 The judges at the Secretariat of the SCJ make vital decisions 
regarding the promotion and positioning of lower court judges.13
In contrast to the relative homogeneity of lower court judges, the justices of 
the SCJ have a more diverse background. Some are career judges, while others 
are former attorneys at law, criminal prosecutors, bureaucrats who worked in 
government, or university professors. The SCJ is composed of three Petty 
8. Kenpo [Constitution of Japan], 3 Nov 1946, art 76(1)-(2).
9. Minoru Nakazato, Mark Ramseyer & Yasutaka Nishikori, “Japan” in Hugh J Ault & Brian 
Arnold, Comparative Income Taxation: A Structural Analysis, 3d ed (Alphen aan den Rijn, The 
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2010) 93 at 103.
10. Constitution of Japan, supra note 8, art 76(3).
11. Saibansho Shokuin Teisu Ho [Law Regarding the Full Number of Judges and Court Staff] Law 
No 53 of 31 March 1951, art 1, as last amended by Law No 18 of 4 April 2014 (Japan). 
The Japan Federation of Bar Associations provides statistics regarding the percentage of 
female judges. See Japan Federation of Bar Associations, “Trends in the Numbers of Judges, 
Prosecutors, and Lawyers,” online: Japan Federation of Bar Associations <www.nichibenren.
or.jp/library/ja/publication/books/data/2013/whitepaper_suii_judge_prosecutor_lawyer.
pdf>. Translations of the titles of Japanese legislation were provided by author.
12. Saibansho Ho [Court Act], Law No 59 of 16 April 1947, arts 40, 50, as last amended by Law 
No 48 of 19 June 2013 (Japan).
13. J Mark Ramseyer & Frances McCall Rosenbluth, Japan’s Political Marketplace (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1993) at 14-15.
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Benches, each consisting of five justices, and one Grand Bench consisting of all 
fifteen justices.14 Cases are typically heard by five justices sitting on one of the 
three Petty Benches.
Tax matters typically make their way to court after two stages of adminis-
trative review: reinvestigation by the Regional Taxation Bureau of the National 
Tax Agency (NTA), and reconsideration by the National Tax Tribunal (NTT). 
A reform initiative is underway that would allow taxpayers to forgo the first 
stage and directly request reconsideration by the NTT.15 The NTT is an external 
organization of the NTA that has jurisdiction to rule on tax complaints indepen-
dently. The NTA is constrained by the NTT’s decision regarding a complaint 
and cannot challenge the result.16 Taxpayers who are unsatisfied with the NTT’s 
decision regarding a request for reconsideration can seek judicial remedies 
in the courts.17
The number of tax cases processed by the NTT and the courts between 
1 April 2013 and 31 March 2014 is shown in Table 1, along with statistics 
regarding taxpayers’ success rates. These statistics, when examined along with 
statistics for previous years, indicate that taxpayers’ rate of success at court is low, 
and this trend has been consistent for decades. It did not change before and after 
the changes of administration in 1993 and 2011.18 It is a matter of debate why 
taxpayers lose so frequently in court in Japan. One theory is that the NTA, as a 
rational repeat player, disproportionately favours judicial resolution of matters 
that it expects will create precedents that are favourable to the government.19 
14. Supreme Court of Japan, “Overview of the Judicial System in Japan: Judicial Power in the 
State,” online: Supreme Court of Japan <www.courts.go.jp>.
15. Gyosei Fufuku Shinsaho No Shiko Ni Tomonau Kankeihouritsu No Seibito Ni Knasuru Horitsu 
[The Law Regarding the Implementation of Administrative Appeal Act], Law No 69 of 13 June 
2014 (Japan). The law will become effective by June 2016.
16. Kokuzei Tsusoku Ho [Act on General Rules for National Taxes], Law No 66 of 2 April 1962, arts 
78, 99, as last amended by Law No 72 of 18 June 2014 (Japan).
17. Ibid, art 114; Gyosei Jiken Sosho Ho [Administrative Case Litigation Act], Law No 139 of 16 
May 1962, art 8, as last amended by Law No 69 of 13 June 2014 (Japan).
18. See Commissioner of the National Tax Agency Secretariat Planning Division, “Tax 
Statistics: Appeal and Lawsuit Relationships,” online: <www.nta.go.jp/kohyo/tokei/
kokuzeicho/sonota2013/pdf/fufukushinsa.pdf> [NTA, “Tax Statistics”]; Commissioner of 
the National Tax Agency Secretariat Planning Division, “Administrative Review: Request 
for Reinvestigation,” online: <www.nta.go.jp/kohyo/tokei/kokuzeicho/sonota2004/02.
pdf> [NTA, “Administrative Review”]. Translations of Japanese document titles were 
provided by author.
19. J Mark Ramseyer & Eric B Rasmusen, “Why the Japanese Taxpayer Always Loses” (1999) 
72:2&3 S Cal L Rev 571 at 576-77.
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According to this theory, taxpayers seem to lose in court because many cases are 
settled in favour of taxpayers before reaching the litigation stage.
TABLE 1: TAX CASES DECIDED BY THE NATIONAL TAX TRIBUNAL AND JAPANESE 
COURTS BETWEEN 1 APRIL 2013 AND 31 MARCH 2014









Tribunal 3,073 73 163 2,678 159
District 
Court 159 10 8 119 23
High 
Court 102 4 1 95 2
Supreme 
Court 67 1 — 66 —
SOURCE: National Tax Agency, “Tax Statistics: Appeal and Lawsuit Relationships,” online: 
<www.nta.go.jp>.
NOTE: The classification of cases into the above categories was performed by NTA staff.
In terms of overall statistics, the success rate of taxpayers has remained 
relatively stable since 1993.20 It is widely believed, however, that the landscape 
for tax litigation in Japan began to change around the year 2000.21 Since then a 
number of high profile SCJ decisions have held in favour of taxpayers who were 
large, well-known businesses. These cases generally involved large sums of money 
and received considerable attention in the popular press.22
Indeed, the SCJ has not hesitated to overturn some of the NTA’s established 
assessment practices. In Migiyama, a case that dealt with the income tax treatment 
of a fee paid to acquire golf memberships, the court expanded the scope of 
acquisition costs for the purpose of computing capital gains.23 The NTA quickly 
changed its position accordingly and issued an interpretative circular following 
20. See NTA, “Tax Statistics,” supra note 18 (for statistics from 2008 to 2013); NTA, 
“Administrative Review,” supra note 18 (for statistics around the year 1993).
21. Kiyoshi Nakayama, “Resolution of Tax Disputes in Japan” (2007) 61:9/10 Bull Int’l 
Taxation 459 at 463.
22. In one case a corporate taxpayer was allowed to deduct a bad debt loss of 351 billion Japanese 
Yen (JPY). See Supreme Court, 24 December 2004, 58:9 Minshu 2637, [2004] JPSC 62 
(AsianLII). In another case, a corporate taxpayer was allowed a depreciation deduction 
of 11 billion JPY. See Supreme Court, 16 September 2008, 62:8 Minshu 2087, [2008] 
JPSC 42 (AsianLII).
23. Supreme Court, 1 February 2005, 1893 Hanrei Jiho 17.
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the SCJ’s decision.24 An even more dramatic example is the result in Hamanaka.25 
In this case the SCJ held that an exemption provision in the Income Tax Law 
should be applied to the future value of an annuity received by a wife under 
a life insurance product that had been purchased by her deceased husband.26 
Although the monetary value of the exemption at issue in this particular case 
was small, the decision affected many other taxpayers who had purchased similar 
life insurance products. After the SCJ issued this decision, the NTA refunded 
the income tax paid by these other taxpayers retroactive to 2005. Subsequent 
legislation authorized refunds for the calendar years 2000 to 2004.27
II. THE ROLE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN 
STATUTE-BASED TAXATION
A. THE PRINCIPLE OF STATUTE-BASED TAXATION
Article 84 of the Constitution of Japan stipulates that “no new taxes shall be 
imposed or existing ones modified except by law or under such conditions as 
law may prescribe.”28 In other words, taxation must be based on statutes created 
by the National Diet, Japan’s national legislature.29 This constitutional principle 
is generally considered to support a literal approach to the interpretation of tax 
statutes.30 This position is based on the principles of democracy and liberty.
On the one hand, the supremacy of the legislature is rooted in the ideals of 
democracy. If judges and tax officers are allowed to step away from the literal 
meaning of the words chosen by the Diet, they can in effect override the decisions 
of the Diet, whose members are elected by the people. This would contravene the 
division of powers among the three branches of government.
24. Shotoku Zeiho Kihon Tsutatsu [Income Tax Law Basic Circular], art 60-2 (Japan). The Income 
Tax Law Basic Circular provides the NTA’s interpretation of each article of the Income Tax 
Law. See also Income Tax Law, infra note 26.
25. Supreme Court, 7 June 2010, 64:5 Minshu 1277, [2010] JPSC 23 (AsianLII).
26. Shotoku Zeiho [Income Tax Law], Law No 33 of 31 March 1965, art 9(1), no 15, as last 
amended by Law No 91 of 21 June 2014 (Japan). The provision at issue was renumbered to 
art 9(1), no 16 under the current law.
27. Sozei Tokubetsu Sochi Ho [Special Tax Measures Law] Law No 26 of 31 March 1957, art 97-2, 
as last amended by Law No 91 of 27 June 2014 (Japan).
28. Constitution of Japan, supra note 8, art 84.
29. Hiroshi Kaneko, “The Principle of Statute-based Taxation in Japan: Trends of Scholars’ 
Opinion and Case Law” (2004) 32:1 INTERTAX 17 at 17.
30. See Hiroshi Kaneko, Sozeiho [Tax Law] 19th ed (Japan: Kobundo, 2014) at 112; Setsuo 
Taniguchi, Zeiho Kihon Kogi [Basic Lecture on Tax Law] 4th ed (Japan: Kobundo, 2014) at 
38; Tadao Okamura et al, Basic Zeiho [Basic Tax Law] 7th ed (Japan: Yuhikaku, 2013) at 37.
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On the other hand, the principle of statute-based taxation guarantees the 
liberty of private parties by creating clear ex ante rules. Literal interpretation 
of tax legislation can provide certainty and preclude unforeseen consequences. 
In a case dealing with the retroactive application of an income tax provision 
disallowing loss utilization, the SCJ explicitly stated that one of the purposes of 
Article 84 is to guarantee legal certainty in taxation.31
Thus, Japanese commentators generally tend to emphasize a literal approach 
to interpreting tax legislation.32 A closer examination of SCJ decisions reveals, 
however, that judges facing tax disputes often also consider the objective and 
purpose of the tax provisions at issue and sometimes deviate from a strict, literal 
approach to statutory interpretation. In these cases, the SCJ has adopted broader 
or narrower interpretations of the statutory language at issue in an effort to give 
effect to the objective and purpose of the legislation.
B. EXPANDING AND NARROWING THE MEANING OF A WORD
The SCJ’s decision in Fujibayashi is a textbook example of how judges can 
expand the literal meaning of words contained in a tax statute in order to arrive 
at a preferred conclusion.33 This case arose under the Commodity Tax Law that 
preceded the present Value Added Tax (VAT) under the Consumption Tax Law.34 
The commodity tax was imposed only on items specified in the Commodity Tax 
Law. The issue was whether a racing car should be characterized as a “normal 
passenger automobile” for taxation purposes, even though it could not be driven 
on the street because it did not satisfy safety standards for road vehicles. The 
automobile was only used for the purpose of racing on a closed track. The SCJ 
held that the car was taxable as a “normal passenger automobile” because it was 
not used for any special purpose. The automobile was not allowed on the street 
merely because it was designed to fit the purpose of automobile racing. The 
dissenting opinion of Justice Ozaki countered this point. He argued that the 
racing car had a special use and fell outside the category of a “normal” passenger 
vehicle, given its nature, function, and intended use.
31. Supreme Court, 22 September 2011, 65:6 Minshu 2756 at 2762.
32. See supra note 30.
33. Supreme Court, 11 November 1997, 1654 Hanrei Jiho 71.
34. Buppinzei Ho [Commodity Tax Law], Law No 48 of 31 March 1962 (Japan) (repealed on 
1 April 1989); Shohizei Ho [Consumption Tax Law], Law No 108 of 30 December 1988 
(Japan). The Commodity Tax Law was repealed when the Consumption Tax Law came into 
effect on 1 April 1989. This article uses the term “VAT” interchangeably with the term 
“Consumption Tax” when referring to taxation measures under the Consumption Tax Law.
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From a policy perspective, the SCJ’s expansive reading of the word “normal” 
in this case closed a tax loophole. The tax base of the Commodity Tax Law at 
the time was narrow and was not suitably updated. In order to be taxable, this 
rather special car had to fit into the category of a “normal passenger automobile” 
despite its use for racing purposes. Although the court’s decision closed the tax 
loophole and arguably represented better tax policy, the majority’s opinion did 
not expressly discuss the defects of the archaic commodity tax.
Policymakers outside the court were quicker to react to the outdated tax, 
however. In 1988, a few years before this decision was rendered, the Commodity 
Tax Law was repealed, and the Consumption Tax Law enacted a broad-based VAT 
in its place.35 The tax assessment years at issue in Fujibayashi were 1984 to 1988, 
and thus the repealed Commodity Tax Law still applied. The current VAT under 
the Consumption Tax Law, however, is imposed on a broadly defined category 
of “transfers of taxable assets,” including services, and there is little doubt that it 
would have applied to the racing car in question.36
In contrast, the SCJ’s decision in Suda is an example of narrow statutory 
interpretation.37 The VAT under the Consumption Tax Law had been in place 
for several years when this dispute arose. In this case, a carpenter claimed an 
input tax credit, but tax officials denied it after the carpenter failed to produce 
his accounting records. The carpenter later produced his records at the litigation 
stage. The issue was whether the taxpayer “did not keep books or receipts,” which 
was a prescribed condition for the NTA’s refusal to grant an input tax credit 
under the Consumption Tax Law.38 The carpenter argued that keeping books and 
receipts in the physical sense was sufficient and that it did not matter that he hid 
them from the tax auditors at the time of the tax audit.
The SCJ held that a taxpayer must be fully prepared to produce his or her 
accounting records when audited. According to the court, the taxpayer “did not 
keep books or receipts” because he failed to arrange his books and receipts in the 
manner prescribed in the Consumption Tax Cabinet Order, which would have 
enabled him to produce his records to a tax auditor on a timely basis.39 In other 
words, merely “keeping” books and receipts in a physical sense was insufficient 
to satisfy the threshold required to claim the input tax credit. This put an end to 
35. Ibid.
36. Consumption Tax Law, supra note 34, art 4.
37. Supreme Court, 16 December 2004, 58:9 Minshu 2458, [2004] JPSC 60 (AsianLII) [Suda 
cited to Minshu].
38. Consumption Tax Law, supra note 34, art 30(7), prior to amendment by Law No 109 of 
2 December 1994.
39. Ibid at art 50(1); Suda, supra note 37 at 2465.
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a controversy that had produced a number of conflicting lower court decisions.40 
The controversy was also reflected in Justice Takii’s dissenting opinion in a 
companion case in which a majority of the court reached the same conclusion.41
C. LITERAL VERSUS TELEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION
The SCJ’s decision in Ito is an example of a decision in which the court took into 
account the purpose of the legislation at issue as well as the literal meaning of 
its statutory language.42 At issue was the meaning of the phrase “number of days 
within the accounting period for the amount to be paid” under the withholding 
provision of the Income Tax Law.43 Under this provision, the owners of a pub 
(“withholding agents”) must withhold income taxes when they pay remunera-
tion to the hosts and bartenders they employ. The withholding tax is 10 per 
cent of the amount paid minus an amount stipulated under Cabinet Order.44 
The applicable Cabinet Order stipulated that the deductible amount was 5,000 
Japanese Yen (JPY) multiplied by the “number of days within the accounting 
period for the amount to be paid” for one payment to a single person.45
In this case, a pub owner paid remuneration to hosts and bartenders twice 
a month and calculated the amount of tax withheld based on the view that the 
“number of days within the accounting period for the amount to be paid” meant 
the total number of calendar days in each pay period. Thus, the total amount that 
the pub owner withheld from each employee’s remuneration in each pay period 
was reduced by approximately 75,000 JPY (5,000 JPY multiplied by half the 
days in the month). The NTA took a different view. According to the NTA, the 
“number of days within the accounting period for the amount to be paid” meant 
the number of days that each host or bartender had worked for the employer 
within the accounting period. For example, if the host or bartender worked only 
eight days at the pub in a given pay period, the amount withheld would be 
reduced by 40,000 JPY (5,000 JPY multiplied by 8 days).
40. See e.g. Osaka District Court, 10 August 1998, 1661 Hanrei Jiho 31 (allowing an input tax 
credit); Nagoya High Court, 24 March 2000, 47:7 Shomu Geppo 2016 (denying an input 
tax credit); Tokyo District Court, 30 March 1990, 46:2 Shomu Geppo 899 (disallowing an 
input tax credit based on the inference of evidence).
41. Supreme Court, 20 December 2004, 1889 Hanrei Jiho 42.
42. Supreme Court, 2 March 2010, 64:2 Minshu 420, [2010] JPSC 5 (AsianLII).
43. Income Tax Law, supra note 26, arts 204(1), 205(2); Shotoku Zeiho Shikorei [Income Tax Law 
Enforcement Order], Cabinet Order No 96 of 31 March 1965, art 322, as last amended by 
Cabinet Order No 338 of 18 October 2014 (Japan).
44. Income Tax Law, supra note 26, arts 204(1), 205(1).
45. Income Tax Law Enforcement Order, supra note 43, art 322.
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The court decided in favour of the pub owner, relying on a literal interpre-
tation of the word “period.” According to the court, the concept of a period is 
generally understood as representing continuity of time between two points in 
a sequence of time. Therefore, the court concluded that the phrase “number of 
days within the accounting period for the amount to be paid” connoted time 
continuity from the first day to the last day of the pay period in question.
To reinforce this interpretation, the court stated that provisions of tax statutes 
should be construed literally unless there is good reason to adopt a more liberal 
interpretation. Significantly, however, the court went on to justify its adopted 
interpretation based on the legislative purpose of the deduction rule, which was to 
reduce the time, effort, and costs involved in refunding excess withholding tax.46 
The court thus considered the purpose of the legislation and sustained a literal 
interpretation of the term “period” as a result of this substantive consideration.
From a practical perspective, this decision is likely to result in larger 
deductions from the withholding tax base. For example, suppose that four 
different pub owners employ the same host or bartender during a particular pay 
period. Each owner is required to apply deductions to the withholding tax base 
of the employee on a cumulative full day basis for the entire pay period regardless 
of how many days the employee worked for each owner. The result is that the 
sum of tax withheld by all four owners may be less than the tax withheld if the 
employee worked the same number of days for only one pub owner. The court 
did not discuss whether this result was appropriate from a tax policy perspective. 
The court implied, however, that this result is consistent with the legislative 
purpose of deductions from the withholding tax base: avoiding refunds.
On the other hand, the SCJ’s decision in Zen (Reverse Half-Tax Plan) placed 
more explicit emphasis on the purpose of the legislation at issue.47 In this case 
four executives of a corporation received sizable payments on maturity of policies 
issued by a life insurance company. The executives included the amount received 
on maturity of the policies as an amount received in respect of gross income 
under the category of occasional income on their tax returns. Occasional income 
is generally accorded preferential tax treatment in the form of a special statutory 
deduction of 500,000 JPY and a 50 per cent exclusion from the aggregate 
income tax base.48 In addition to categorizing the insurance benefit received as 
occasional income, for the purpose of computing their net income the executives 
also deducted the full cost of the related insurance premium incurred by their 
46. Suda, supra note 37 at 426.
47. Supreme Court, 13 January 2012, 66:1 Minshu 1 [Reverse Half-Tax Plan].
48. Income Tax Law, supra note 26, art 34.
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corporate employer. The issue was whether the insurance premium was deductible 
as “the amount paid for gaining the revenue” under the Income Tax Law.49
The SCJ held that the taxpayer must bear the burden and pay the amount 
in order to deduct it as “the amount paid for gaining the revenue.” Although 
the corporation initially paid the full amount of the insurance premium, half 
of the premium was treated as a loan to the executives who would ultimately 
bear the burden of paying this portion of the amount. Therefore, 50 per cent of 
the insurance premium amount was allowed as a deduction in the hands of the 
executives. Because the executives did not bear the burden of paying the other 50 
per cent, this portion was not deductible in calculating their personal net income 
but was instead a deductible expense for the corporation.
The court gave two reasons for this holding. First, the purpose of deducting 
“the amount paid for gaining the revenue” in respect of occasional income was 
to support taxation under the Income Tax Law based on an individual’s ability 
to pay.50 The court’s secondary reason was that the phrase “the amount paid for 
gaining the revenue” presupposes that the same taxpayer is earning the income 
claimed and making payments in respect of the income source.
Justice Sudo wrote a separate supporting opinion. He agreed with the 
majority’s decision but made two further points. First, the majority’s interpretation 
of the provision at issue was consistent with the provision’s object and purpose, 
and did not conflict with the principle of statute-based taxation required under 
the Constitution.51 Second, the majority’s opinion did not detract from legal 
certainty and predictability. Justice Sudo reasoned that it was a commonsense 
assumption that an income earner and an expense payer should be the same 
person, and it would be unreasonable to treat the same amount as a deductible 
expense for both a corporation and an individual.
The court’s decision thus rejected one aspect of a life insurance product 
tax-planning scheme. The court did not, however, address an undisputed 
background issue: the under-taxation of fringe benefits at the time when the 
corporation paid insurance premiums on behalf of its executives.52 In this case 
the corporation was party to endowment insurance contracts with the life 
insurance company from 1996 to 1998. The contractual terms specified that 
49. Ibid, art 34(2).
50. Reverse Half-Tax Plan, supra note 47 at 7.
51. Constitution of Japan, supra note 8, art 84.
52. The court did not comment on this background issue. See Yusuke Takahashi, “Case 
Comment” (2012) 1441 Jurist 8. The facts and mortality tables discussed in this paragraph 
are drawn from Takashi’s case comment.
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the insured persons were the executives and their family members. The duration 
of the contracts ranged from three to five years. The contractual terms specified 
that if the executives died within this period the benefit would be paid to the 
corporation, and if the executives were alive at the end of this period, the benefit 
would be paid to the executives. Mortality tables for 1996 indicated that the 
probability of death within five years was 2.4 per cent for a fifty-year-old Japanese 
male. Assuming that the executives had a mean age of fifty when the endowment 
contracts were executed, the probability that the insured executives and family 
members would receive the benefit was higher than 97.6 per cent. Thus, the result 
of the decision in Reverse Half-Tax Plan is that, as long as the insured executives 
bore the burden of paying 50 per cent of the insurance premiums, the executives 
were untaxed on the fringe benefits and deferred taxation until the receipt of the 
insurance benefits. Once received, the insurance benefits were only subject to the 
preferential taxation regime accorded to the category of occasional income.
D. THE TRANSPLANTED CATEGORY
When judges decide a tax case, they often face a number of issues concerning 
the degree to which they respect the legal form of a transaction or tax structure 
selected by private parties. These issues have several dimensions. One distinct 
issue discussed in Japan is how to interpret concepts that are borrowed from 
other fields of law, most notably private law, in the context of tax adjudication.
Brooks discussed the “fallacy of the transplanted category” in order to 
illustrate the differences between originalist and pragmatic approaches to tax law 
interpretation.53 His example was the distinction under Canadian income tax 
legislation between a taxpayer earning income from “employment” and income 
from “business.”54 Brooks argued that it was logically fallacious for Canadian 
judges to base their tax law interpretation of the term “employment” on concepts 
articulated in tort law or labour law.55 Fortunately this specific issue does not 
arise under Japanese law because the Income Tax Law defines “employment 
income” rather broadly, and Japanese courts distinguish employment income 
from business income without relying on jurisprudence from other areas of law.56
In a more general context, however, Japanese courts often refer to private law 
constructions and interpretations in developing tax law concepts. For example, in 
53. Brooks, supra note 1 at 122.
54. See generally Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp), ss 5-8 (income from employment), 
9-26 (income from a business or property).
55. Ibid.
56. See Supreme Court, 24 April 1981, 35:3 Minshu 672.
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Suzuya Kinyu the interpretative issue was the meaning of “profit dividends” that 
were subject to withholding tax under the Income Tax Law.57 In the absence of 
a tax definition of profits out of which dividends are paid, the court stated that 
the Income Tax Law adopted the Commercial Code concept of profit dividends.58 
According to the court, profit dividends under the Income Tax Law were not 
restricted to dividends that were lawfully distributed under the Commercial Code, 
but included dividends that were the subject of Commercial Code regulation and 
that were considered illegal under the Commercial Code.59 Applying this interpre-
tation to the facts of the case, the court concluded that the payment in question 
was not a payment of profit dividends because the company was obliged to make 
regular payments of the same percentage amount regardless of the existence of 
accounting profits. The court therefore denied the withholding tax assessment.
Similar to the decision in Suzuya Kinyu, the court in Kangyo Keizai also 
referred to a private law concept when it denied the application of the withholding 
tax regime.60 At issue was the concept of Tokumei Kumiai (TK), a tax structure 
the origin of which was a sleeping partnership in continental Europe.61 The TK 
structure in this case was utilized as a device to distribute profits out of Japan 
without the application of Japanese withholding tax. In affirming the validity 
of this structure, the court relied on the Commercial Code concept of a TK and 
rendered moot the legislative purpose of the 1953 Income Tax Law amendment, 
which was intended to cover a wide range of profit distributions in financial 
structures resembling the TK structure.62
57. Supreme Court, 7 October 1960, 14:12 Minshu 2420, 238 Hanrei Jiho 2 [Suzuya Kinyu 
cited to Minshu]; Law No 27 of 31 March 1947, as amended by Law No 11 of 27 March 
1952, art 9(1), no 2.
58. Shoho [Commercial Code], Law No 48 of 9 March 1899, art 290, prior to amendment by the 
introduction of Kaisha Ho [Company Act], Law No 87 of 26 July 2005 (Japan).
59. See Commercial Code, supra note 58, arts 290, 293. These articles render dividends 
containing return of capital and dividends in violation of the shareholder equality 
principle illegal.
60. Supreme Court, 27 October 1961, 15:9 Minshu 2357 [Kangyo Keizai].
61. Yoshihiro Masui, “Taxation of Partnerships in Japan” (2000) 54:4 Bull Int’l Taxation 
150 at 151-52 [Masui, “Taxation”]; Tokyo High Court, 28 June 2007, 1985 Hanrei 
Jiho 23 [Guidant]. The court’s decision in Guidant affirmed the application of the “other 
income” clause in the Japan-Netherlands tax treaty to TK structures. Amendments to the 
Japan-Netherlands tax treaty in 2010 subsequently permitted the Japanese government to 
impose a withholding tax on income generated through a TK structure. See Convention 
Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and Japan for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, 25 August 2010, art 20 (entered 
into force 1 January 2012).
62. Supra note 57, as amended by Law No 73 of 7 August 1953.
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An examination of these older cases might give the impression that the SCJ 
fell into the very “fallacy” that Brooks criticized. Indeed, there are more recent 
Japanese decisions in which the courts have relied on the private law meaning of 
a term when interpreting tax statutes.63
Japanese courts have not always followed private law interpretations uncriti-
cally, however. The SCJ’s decision in Miyagi illustrates the flexibility of Japanese 
tax jurisprudence to deviate from private law concepts when the context requires.64 
In this case, the court interpreted the concept of a “gift” under the Income Tax 
Law differently from the concept of a “gift” under the Civil Code.65 In particular, 
the court held that the definition of a “gift” in a carryover basis provision did 
not include an onerous gift the economic benefit of which accrued to the donor. 
Though the SCJ did not explain the tax logic underlying this holding, it affirmed 
the lower court’s judgment contrasting the following two scenarios to explain 
why the carryover basis provision did not apply in this case.66
In scenario one, Ichiro donates a personal asset of his to Yoko. Although 
capital gains are generally taxable under Japan’s Income Tax Law, Ichiro’s personal 
income taxation on the unrealized gains or losses of this asset is deferred rather 
than triggered at the time of the donation. Yoko becomes the full owner of the 
asset, and her basis and holding period in respect of the asset are carried over 
from Ichiro under the carryover basis provision. This mechanism ensures that 
the deferred gains or losses will be taxed in the person of Yoko on her eventual 
disposal of the asset.
In scenario two, Ichiro donates his personal asset to Yoko on condition that 
she immediately repay a personal debt Ichiro owes to a bank. This is the case 
of an onerous gift. An economic benefit accrues to Ichiro to the extent that he 
is discharged of his debt to the bank. The capital gains or losses accrued in the 
donated asset are taxable in Ichiro’s hands because the economic benefit to him 
(relief from his debt) is consideration provided by Yoko for receiving the asset. 
Under the Income Tax Law, this economic benefit is taxable in Ichiro’s hands 
as gross income.
63. See e.g. Supreme Court, 9 September 1997, 44:6 Shomu Geppo 1009. In this case the 
SCJ interpreted the definition of “spouse” under the Income Tax Law as requiring a legally 
effective marriage under the Civil Code and limited the scope of marital deductions 
accordingly. The policy consequence was that marital deductions under the Income Tax Law 
did not apply to spouses of de facto marriages and civil unions. See Civil Code, infra note 65.
64. Supreme Court, 19 July 1988, 1290 Hanrei Jiho 56 [Miyagi].
65. Income Tax Law, supra note 26, art 60(1), no 1; Minpo [Civil Code], Law No 9 of 21 June 
1899, art 549, as last amended by Law No 94 of 11 December 2013 (Japan).
66. Tokyo High Court, 9 September 1987, 38:8-9 Gyoshu 987 at 993.
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The lower court noted that in scenario two it would be absurd to apply the 
carryover basis provision to Yoko. Because the gift was an onerous one, her basis 
in the asset received should be defined as equal to her acquisition cost, which is 
the amount of debt she repaid on Ichiro’s behalf. Yoko’s holding period in the 
asset should also be shorter, starting from the day on which she acquired the 
asset. Consequently, the lower court reasoned that the concept of a “gift” in the 
carryover basis provision does not include an onerous gift the economic benefit 
of which accrues to the donor.
Therefore, while the SCJ’s decisions in Suzuya Kinyu and Kangyo Keizai 
established the principle of reliance on legal definitions from transplanted areas 
of law when interpreting tax legislation, the more recent case of Miyagi indicates 
the courts’ willingness to depart from strict reliance on private law concepts when 
the tax law result would otherwise be absurd and the context so requires.
III. RESPONSES TO TAX AVOIDANCE
A. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
Japan’s tax law does not have a General Anti-Avoidance Rule,67 and its absence 
was a deliberate choice in 1962 when the General Law of National Taxes was 
enacted. The Tax Commission, a policy council to the Prime Minister, suggested 
creation of a general anti-avoidance provision based on economic substance.68 The 
Commission’s proposal invited fierce debate and did not find its way into the bill.
Instead, Japan has a number of fairly broad Specific Anti-Avoidance 
Rules.69 SAARs targeting family corporations date back to 1923, with current 
rules applying to income tax, corporation tax, inheritance tax, and gift tax.70 
Similar SAARs were introduced for corporate reorganizations in 2001 and for 
67. Tasuku Honjo, “Trends in Tax Avoidance Provisions and Doctrines in Japan” (2007) 61:9 
Bull Int’l Taxation 432.
68. Kokuzei Tsusokuho No Seitei Ni Kansuru Toshin Oyobi Sono Setsumei [Report and its 
Explanations on the Enactment of the Act on General Rules for National Taxes] (1961) at 4, 
online: Japan Tax Association <www.soken.or.jp/p_document/zeiseishousakai_pdf/s_s3607_
kokuzeitusokuho.pdf>.
69. Tadashi Murai, “Japan” in International Fiscal Association, “Form and Substance in Tax Law” 
(2002) 87a C de D Fiscal Int’l 379.
70. Hojin Zeiho [Corporation Tax Law], Law No 34 of 31 March 1965, art 132, as last amended 
by Law No 72 of 18 June 2014 (Japan); Income Tax Law, supra note 26, art 157; Sozoku 
Zeiho [Inheritance Tax Law], Law No 73 of 31 March 1950, art 64, as amended by Law No 
69 of 13 June 2014 (Japan).
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consolidated tax returns in 2002.71 The scope of these SAARs is quite broad given 
that nearly 97 per cent of all corporations incorporated in Japan fall into the 
category of family corporations.72 Moreover, these SAARs provide a potentially 
broad range for administrative discretion in their application. They function 
together much like a quasi-GAAR. For example, they provide the NTA with 
authority to recalculate the amount of tax owed if it finds that the burden of taxes 
is “unfairly reduced.”73 The meaning of “unfairly reduced” has been left to judicial 
interpretation. Aside from these SAARs, there exist numerous narrowly targeted 
SAARs, which have tended to proliferate over the years.
Despite the relative breadth and number of SAARs in Japan, there are 
nevertheless situations in which no SAAR applies. In these cases, the issue arises 
as to whether the court may engage in an interpretive exercise to deny taxpayers’ 
attempts at tax avoidance, or if the court must respect private parties’ selection of 
a particular transactional form despite obvious attempts at tax avoidance. There 
are decisions pointing both ways.
B. RESPECTING PRIVATE PARTIES’ CHARACTERIZATION OF A 
TRANSACTION
The SCJ has not made its stance clear on the issue of whether, in the absence 
of a GAAR, private parties can avoid taxation through selection of a particular 
transactional form that is outside the scope of the SAARs. At the lower court 
level, the Tokyo High Court has held that private parties’ characterization of a 
transaction should be respected. In Iwase the court noted that, in the absence 
of explicit legislative authorization, the NTA may not counter private parties’ 
tax avoidance efforts by recasting the transactional form selected by the private 
parties.74 Commentators awaited the SCJ’s response, but the SCJ refused to hear 
71. See Corporation Tax Law, supra note 70, art 132-2, introduced by Law No 6 of 30 March 
2001 (this article provides the SAAR for corporate reorganizations); Corporation Tax Law, 
supra note 70, art 132-3, introduced by Law No 79 of 3 July 2002 (this article provides the 
SAAR for consolidated tax returns). Two SCJ decisions in prominent cases involving the 
application of the SAAR for corporate reorganizations are pending. See Tokyo High Court, 
5 November 2014, LEX/DB 25505180 [Yahoo]; Tokyo District Court, 9 May 2014, LEX/
DB 25503893 [Japan IBM]. In Yahoo the High Court decided in favour of the government, 
whereas in Japan IBM the District Court decided in favour of the taxpayer.
72. National Tax Agency, Kaisha Hyohon Chosa [Company Sample Survey] (2014) at 158, online: 
<www.nta.go.jp/kohyo/tokei/kokuzeicho/kaishahyohon2012/pdf/11.pdf>.
73. Corporation Tax Law, supra note 70, art 132(1).
74. Tokyo High Court, 21 June 1999, 52 Kosai Minshu 26 [Iwase].
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the government’s appeal of the Tokyo High Court’s decision in Iwase75 and has 
not pronounced its opinion on this issue.
A more recent case indicates that the SCJ may also favour strict application 
of tax statutes. In the Takefuji case, the SCJ permitted the taxpayer’s avoidance 
of gift tax because the donee was found to have no residence in Japan within 
the meaning of the Inheritance Tax Law.76 The court rejected the lower court’s 
determination of facts, which had disregarded the tax planning elements of the 
scheme, and found that the donee was based in Hong Kong at the time of the 
gift. Justice Sudo, in a supporting opinion, adopted a strict interpretation of the 
residence requirement. He denounced the tax planning scheme at issue as being 
extremely unfair, but opined that the court should not tread into the realm of 
the legislature. Immediately after the scheme became known to the public (and 
long before the SJC’s decision), the government amended the gift tax to capture 
certain non-resident citizens.77
C. COUNTERING TAX AVOIDANCE
On the other hand, there is a line of SCJ decisions in which the court has invoked 
creative interpretations of tax statutes to deny taxpayers’ claims. In these cases the 
court did not grant the NTA a general power to recharacterize transactions at 
will, but the end result in each case was tantamount to a denial of the taxpayers’ 
attempts at tax avoidance.
In the Resona Bank case, a Japanese commercial bank was involved in a 
complicated international transaction to take advantage of its unused foreign 
tax credit allowance.78 This transaction involved various foreign corporations and 
was conducted as follows. A New Zealand corporation (A) established a wholly-
owned subsidiary (B) in the Cook Islands for the purpose of reducing corporation 
tax on investment returns from Eurobonds purchased using funds collected from 
investors. The parent company A also incorporated a tax-exempt subsidiary 
(C) in the Cook Islands. In order to avoid the application of withholding tax, 
corporation C initially raised and received the funds from investors and channeled 
the funds to B. B managed the funds.
75. Supreme Court, 13 June 2003, 253 Zeimu Sosho Shiryo 9367.
76. Supreme Court, 18 February 2011, 2111 Hanrei Jiho 3 [Takefuji].
77. Sozei Tokubetsu Sochi Ho [Special Tax Measure Law], Law No 26 of 31 March 1957, art 
69(2), prior to amendment by Law No 8 of 31 March 2003 (Japan). In 2003, the same rule 
was incorporated in the Inheritance Tax Law. See Inheritance Tax Law, supra note 70, arts 
1-4(2), 2-2(1), as amended by Law No 8 of 31 March 2003 (Japan).
78. Supreme Court, 19 December 2005, 59:10 Minshu 2964, [2005] JPSC 76 (AsianLII) 
[Resona Bank cited to Minshu].
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Under this structure, if C lent the invested funds directly to B (in order for 
B to purchase the Eurobonds), the interest payments that C received from B in 
respect of the loan would have been fully subject to a 15 per cent Cook Islands 
withholding tax. In order to neutralize the effect of this withholding tax liability, 
B and C entered into an arrangement with the Singapore branch of the Japanese 
bank, in which the bank made a loan of 50 million American dollars to B at an 
interest rate of 10.85 per cent annually. B agreed to pay this interest to the bank, 
minus the applicable 15 per cent Cook Islands withholding tax. C, for its part, 
agreed to make a deposit with the bank of an amount equal to the total funds 
lent to B under the loan contract. The bank agreed to return the deposit principal 
to C to the extent that the bank received repayment of the loan principal from 
B. Additionally, the bank agreed that when it received an interest payment from 
B, it would pay interest to C on C’s deposit. The interest payments to C were 
calculated as an amount equal to the interest payment received from B, plus 
the amount withheld under the Cook Islands withholding tax, minus the bank’s 
service charge.
The result of these transactions was that C effectively avoided payment of the 
15 per cent Cook Islands withholding tax on the interest payments it received 
in relation to its indirect loan of funds to B. The bank initially incurred losses 
on the transaction, but could eventually profit from the arrangement through 
benefitting from corporate tax credits in Japan for the foreign tax it paid on 
behalf of B and C. Thus, in computing its tax owed in Japan for three fiscal years, 
the bank’s position was that the Cook Islands withholding tax it paid under the 
loan contract was creditable against the amount of corporate tax it should pay in 
Japan, based on the foreign tax credit mechanism.
The SCJ denied the bank’s claim. It first explained that the policy objectives 
of the foreign tax credit system were to avoid international double taxation of the 
same income, and to maintain tax neutrality on international business activities. 
The court then held that the transactions in this case, viewed in their entirety, 
were structured to avoid taxation in a manner that deviated from these policy 
objectives. Under the arrangement in question, the Japanese bank took advantage 
of its unused foreign tax credit allowance. The bank participated in a venture 
under which it was guaranteed to lose money on a before-tax basis; there was 
no potential for commercial profit without the after-tax benefit that the bank 
derived from the foreign tax credit. The court reasoned that allowing the foreign 
tax credit in this case would constitute an abuse of the foreign tax credit system 
and would harm equity in taxation. It denied the claim accordingly.79
79. Ibid at 2970.
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The case involved fiscal years from 1991 to 1993. In 2001, after this case and 
similar cases were brought to the lower courts, the foreign tax credit provision 
in the Corporation Tax Law was amended specifically to exclude this type 
of arrangement.80
Another case in which the SCJ engaged in creative statutory interpre-
tation to deny a taxpayer’s attempts at tax avoidance is Palazzina.81 This case 
involved a circular transaction structure promoted by Merrill Lynch Capital 
Markets. A Japanese corporation (X) became a partner in a Nin’I Kumiai (NK) 
structure, a type of partnership contemplated by the Civil Code and treated as 
a pass-through entity for taxation purposes.82 The NK structure (B) was formed 
to fund the purchase and distribution of a film. B agreed to purchase the film 
from corporation C for consideration of 2.62 billion JPY (a contribution from its 
partners, including X) plus an additional 6.37 billion JPY (a loan that B obtained 
from a Dutch bank, E). B granted the global distribution rights for the film to 
corporation D, and D further granted these rights to corporation F. F produced 
the film and transferred ownership of it to C prior to B’s purchase of the film 
from C. The result of this structure was that the film returned home to its original 
producer after a round trip.
The film was subject to a two-year depreciation allowance under Japan’s 
Corporation Tax Law.83 X claimed a depreciation allowance corresponding to its 
pro rata share in B, because B was a pass-through entity in which X was a partner.
The SCJ denied X’s depreciation allowance. The court found that B had 
substantially lost its right to use, make profits from, and dispose of the film, that 
B did not bear the risk of defaulting on the loan from E because the loan was 
guaranteed by another bank, and that the partners in B were indifferent to the 
success or failure of the film distribution business.84 Taking note of these facts, 
the court stated that the film in question could not be seen as a source of profit 
in B’s business and therefore could not be said to be employed in B’s business. 
80. Corporation Tax Law, supra note 70, art 69, as amended by Law No 6 of 30 March 2001 
(Japan); Hojin Zeiho Shikorei [Corporation Tax Law Enforcement Order], Cabinet Order 
No 97 of 31 March 1965, art 141(5), as last amended by Cabinet Order No 318 of 30 
September 2014 (Japan).
81. Supreme Court, 24 January 2006, 60:1 Minshu 252, [2006] JPSC 10 (AsianLII) [Palazzina 
cited to Minshu].
82. Minpo [Civil Code], supra note 65, art 667. See Masui, “Taxation,” supra note 61 at 150.
83. Corporation Tax Law, supra note 70, art 31(1); Corporation Tax Law Enforcement Order, 
supra note 80, art 13, no 7; Taiyo Nenshu Shorei [Ministerial Ordinance on the Useful Life of 
Depreciable Assets], Ministry of Finance Ordinance No 15 of 31 March 1965, last amended 
by Ministry of Finance Ordinance No 55 of 9 July 2014 (Japan).
84. Pallazina, supra note 81 at 256.
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The court concluded that the film did not qualify as a depreciable asset within the 
meaning of the depreciation provision of the Corporation Tax Law.85 The fiscal 
years litigated in this case were from 1988 to 1992. In 2005, an at-risk limitation 
on the depreciation allowance deduction was enacted for corporate taxpayers that 
invest in NK structures.
Obunsha Holding is a third example of a case in which the SCJ denied a 
taxpayer’s attempt at tax avoidance based on a creative interpretation of the 
Corporation Tax Law.86 This case was an episode in the aftermath of the fierce 
battle over control of TV Asahi.87 A Dutch company (S) was a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Obunsha Holding Co., a Japanese corporation. S issued new shares 
to another related foreign corporation (A). The shares were issued for a consider-
ation exceedingly below fair market value, thus diluting the value of the old shares.
The NTA found that X transferred economic benefits to A through this 
transaction. The tax authority therefore increased X’s taxable income by an 
amount equal to those economic benefits, relying upon the basic income 
computation provision of the Corporation Tax Law and a SAAR that disallows 
actions of family corporations that would unfairly reduce corporate tax payable.88
The SCJ held in favour of the government with respect to the application of 
the basic income computation provision. According to the court, X transferred 
a clear economic value to A.89 The transfer of value did not arise out of external 
factors beyond X’s control, but was intended by X and agreed to by A. Accordingly, 
the court held that this transfer fell within the meaning of “other transactions” 
in the context of the basic income computation provision, which provides that
[i]n computing taxable income for each accounting period of a domestic corporation, 
the amount to be included in gross revenue in the accounting period shall, unless 
otherwise provided, be the amount of revenue in the said accounting period from sale 
of assets, onerous or gratuitous transfer of assets, or rendering of services, or gratuitous 
acquisition of assets, and other transactions other than capital transactions.90
In adopting a rather expansive interpretation of the term “other transactions,” 
the court denied X’s effort to shift income to a foreign entity. It is interesting that 
the court’s reasoning was based on a relatively broad interpretation of the basic 
85. Ibid.
86. Supreme Court, 24 January 2006, 1923 Hanrei Jiho 20 [Obunsha Holding].
87. See “Court Slaps 10.7 Billion Yen Tax on Publisher,” The Japan Times (29 
January 2004), online: <www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2004/01/29/national/
court-slaps-10-7-billion-yen-tax-bill-on-publisher>.
88. Corporation Tax Law, supra note 70, arts 22(2), 132.
89. Obunsha Holding, supra note 86 at 23.
90. Corporation Tax Law, supra note 70, art 22(2) [emphasis added] [translated by author].
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income computation provision rather than a recharacterization of the transaction 
at issue, given the potential applicability of a SAAR in this case. For example, X’s 
share value in S decreased as a result of the transaction. X lost a corresponding 
economic value, while A gained a benefit of the same amount. This transaction 
could be recharacterized as one in which X made a capital contribution to S, 
and S made a dividend payment to A. An alternate recharacterization could 
include the private foundation (E) that held shares in both A and X. Under 
this recharacterization, X made a dividend payment to E and E made a capital 
contribution to A. The court did not venture to recast the transaction in either 
of these ways, however. Instead, the court read the words “other transactions” in 
the basic income computation provision rather expansively. In this manner, the 
court prevented income shifting from a domestic corporation to a foreign entity.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has characterized the Supreme Court of Japan’s approach to the 
interpretation of tax legislation as a literal approach that nonetheless has due 
regard to the objective and purpose of the statutory provisions at issue in a given 
case. SCJ justices sometimes interpret the wording of tax statutes narrowly, 
and sometimes they interpret it expansively. Their literal interpretation is often 
supported by teleological interpretation. As a general principle, SCJ justices 
interpret transplanted categories of private law concepts in tax statutes without 
modification, but deviate from strict reliance on private law meanings when the 
context so requires. The article also shows that judicial responses to tax avoidance 
in Japan have been rather restrained, although recent decisions have invoked 
creative interpretation of tax statutes to reject abusive tax avoidance schemes. As 
many of these cases worked their way through the courts, legislative amendments 
were enacted to deny the future efficacy of the very tax avoidance schemes at issue. 
Overall, Japanese judges play a significant role in the tax law-making process.
